Unconsented episiotomies and other procedures during labour are commonly reported by women in several countries, and often highlighted in birth activism. Yet, forced caesarean sections aside, the ethics of consent during labour has received little attention. Focusing on episiotomies, this paper addresses whether and how consent in labour should be obtained. We briefly review the rationale for informed consent, distinguishing its intrinsic and instrumental relevance for respecting autonomy. We also emphasise two non-explicit ways of giving consent: implied and opt-out consent. (...) We then discuss challenges and opportunities for obtaining consent in labour and birth, given its unique position in medicine.We argue that consent for procedures in labour is always necessary, but this consent does not always have to be fully informed or explicit. We recommend an individualised approach where the antenatal period is used to exchange information and explore values and preferences with respect to the relevant procedures. Explicit consent should always be sought at the point of intervening, unless women antenatally insist otherwise. We caution against implied consent. However, if a woman does not give a conclusive response during labour and the stakes are high, care providers can move to clearly communicated opt-out consent. Our discussion is focused on episiotomies, but also provides a useful starting point for addressing the ethics of consent for other procedures during labour, as well as general time-critical medical procedures. (shrink)

We read commentaries on our feature article ‘The ethics of consent during labour and birth: episiotomies’1 with gratitude and interest. Nearly all commenting authors agree that consent for in-labour procedures is necessary and ideally given at the point of intervening. Both Shalowitz & Ralston and Stirrat note that this is already required by professional statements and guidelines in the USA2 and UK3, respectively, but also note that practice does not yet conform. The Americans authors helpfully emphasise the importance of multilevel (...) institutional measures for closing this gap, including consent policies and reporting mechanisms, as well as ongoing education.2 The UK writer seconds the role for education within wider shared decision-making and informed choice approaches, and generously commends our paper for close study by all maternity care providers. Others add a cautionary note. Lee applauds all our recommendations, but notes our proposals cannot fully secure autonomy because of, among others, epistemic injustice and other power differentials.4 Kumar-Hazard and Dahlen worry that opt-out consent is equal to substitute decision-making; weakens women’s rights; and is open to abuse.5 Nelson and Clough object to our willlingness to work within a flawed conceptual framework, which ought to be challenged.6 We agree that there are limits to what our proposal can do. It cannot rectify unequal distributions of epistemic credibilities, either in general or in any particular interaction. Risk communication is never neutral;7 “even the most well-meaning healthcare professionals could unwittingly wield influence over birthing women’s …. (shrink)

Gilbert et al. argue that the concerns about the influence of Deep Brain Stimulation on – as they lump together – personality, identity, agency, autonomy, authenticity and the self are due to an ethics hype. They argue that there is only a small empirical base for an extended ethics debate. We will critically examine their claims and argue that Gilbert and colleagues do not show that the identity debate in DBS is a bubble, they in fact give very little evidence (...) for that. Rather they show the challenges of doing research in a field that is stretched out over multiple disciplines. In that sense their paper is an important starting point for a discussion on methodology and offers valuable lessons for a future research agenda. (shrink)

Automated technologies and robots make decisions that cannot always be fully controlled or predicted. In addition to that, they cannot respond to punishment and blame in the ways humans do. Therefore, when automated cars harm or kill people, for example, this gives rise to concerns about responsibility-gaps and retribution-gaps. According to Sven Nyholm, however, automated cars do not pose a challenge on human responsibility, as long as humans can control them and update them. He argues that the agency exercised in (...) automated cars should be understood in terms of human–robot collaborations. This brief note focuses on the problem that arises when there are multiple people involved, but there is no obvious shared collaboration among them. Building on John Danaher’s discussion of command responsibility, it is argued that, although Nyholm might be right that autonomous cars cannot be regarded as acting on their own, independently of any human beings, worries about responsibility-gaps and retribution-gaps are still justified, because it often remains unclear how to allocate or distribute responsibility satisfactorily among the key humans involved after they have been successfully identified. (shrink)

The need for urgent, structural transformations to dominant food systems is increasingly recognized in research and policy. The direction these transformations take is in great part influenced by how the problem is framed and what future pathways become seen as plausible and desirable. Scientific knowledge and the organizations producing it hold considerable authority in suggesting what alternatives are or are not worth pursuing, ultimately shaping frames and in turn being shaped by them. This paper examines Brazil’s federal Agricultural Research Corporation (...) (Embrapa), a major contributor to technological advances that made Brazil into an agricultural powerhouse. We examine the ways in which Embrapa’s leadership has framed sustainable agriculture in its public communication and the wider implications for food systems transformation. Drawing from Embrapa news articles in the period 2015–2020, we identify four interrelated frames forming Embrapa’s prevalent position on sustainability. Our results show that while Embrapa promotes practices based on alternative approaches such as agroecology, its deeper framing often reflects the core assumptions driving dominant industrial food systems. This framing reinforces underlying logics of control, efficiency, and competition aligned with the productivist paradigm and excludes divergent perspectives that exist within the organization. (shrink)

Until recently, the notions of function and multiple realization were supposed to save the autonomy of psychological explanations. Furthermore, the concept of supervenience presumably allows both dependence of mind on brain and non-reducibility of mind to brain, reconciling materialism with an independent explanatory role for mental and functional concepts and explanations. Eliminativism is often seen as the main or only alternative to such autonomy. It gladly accepts abandoning or thoroughly reconstructing the psychological level, and considers reduction if successful as equivalent (...) with elimination. In comparison with the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of biology has developed more subtle and complex ideas about functions, laws, and reductive explanation than the stark dichotomy of autonomy or elimination. It has been argued that biology is a patchwork of local laws, each with different explanatory interests and more or less limited scope. This points to a pluralistic, domain-specific and multi-level view of explanations in biology. Explanatory pluralism has been proposed as an alternative to eliminativism on the one hand and methodological dualism on the other hand. It holds that theories at different levels of description, like psychology and neuroscience, can co-evolve, and mutually influence each other, without the higher-level theory being replaced by, or reduced to, the lower-level one. Such ideas seem to tally with the pluralistic character of biological explanation. In biological psychology, explanatory pluralism would lead us to expect many local and non-reductive interactions between biological, neurophysiological, psychological and evolutionary explanations of mind and behavior. This idea is illustrated by an example from behavioral genetics, where genetics, physiology and psychology constitute distinct but interrelated levels of explanation. Accounting for such a complex patchwork of related explanations seems to require a more sophisticated and precise way of looking at levels than the existing ideas on (reductive and non-reductive) explanation in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

It is generally accepted that liberal states should fund public schools for compulsory education. But whether states should also finance denominational schools is controversial. Does such funding not compromise the principle of liberal neutrality? In this article we evaluate two opposing views on this question. Both views give different interpretations of liberal neutrality and both have contrasting views on the relation between education and conceptions of the good. Arguing that neither view is convincing, we defend an alternative view, which holds (...) that the liberal state under certain conditions should fund denominational schools. (shrink)

Evolutionary psychology is put forward by its defenders as an extension of evolutionary biology, bringing psychology within the integrated causal chain of the hard sciences. It is extolled as a new paradigm for integrating psychology with the rest of science. We argue that such claims misrepresent the methods and explanations of evolutionary biology, and present a distorted view of the consequences that might be drawn from evolutionary biology for views of human nature. General theses about adaptation in biology are empty (...) schemata, not laws of nature allowing the subsumption of mind under biology. Functional thinking is an indispensable tool for psychology, mostly of value in abstractive unification and as a heuristic, but it gains little from association with evolutionary notions of selection. Thus, we argue, the cherished integrative causal model evaporates, and evolutionary phraseology serves no more than rhetorical purposes. Moreover, the universality of human nature and the evolutionary irrelevance of individual variation are presented as biological truths that psychologists should respect in their approach to mind. On closer inspection, this turns out to be rather dubious biology. Psychology might conceivably be better off as a continuation of biology by different means, but evolutionary psychology does not provide the conceptual integration leading to such a happy union. (shrink)

In this series of papers, I attempt to provide an answer to the question how the Babylonian scholars arrived at their mathematical theory of planetary motion. Paper I (de Jong in Arch Hist Exact Sci 73:1–37, 2019) was devoted to a study of system A theory of the outer planets. In this second paper, I will study system A theory of the planet Venus. All presently known ephemerides of Venus appear to have been written after 200 BC so that the (...) development of system A theory of Venus may have been a late development. On the other hand, there are several earlier texts in which the motion of Venus, going from one synodic phenomenon to the next one, is parametrized in quite some detail. At least six computational systems of Venus are known of which only two, systems A0 and A3, are genuine type-A systems. Both are based on the hypothesis that in exactly 1151 years Venus experiences 720 synodic phenomena of the same kind and that after this period of 1151 years Venus returns to exactly the same position in the sky. This period relation was probably derived from the observational fact that after 8 years Venus returns to a position in the zodiac that falls on average 2.5° short of its previous position. The study of the Babylonian planetary theory of Venus presented here will be primarily based on the system A3 theory of Venus because it is the most complete of the two systems. The parameters of the four step functions characterizing the system A3 model of the first and last appearances of Venus are known from previous studies of tablet BM 32599 (ACT 1050). Based on a database of synthetic observations of the first and last appearances (morning first, morning last, evening first and evening last) and the two stationary points (morning station and evening station) of Venus between 315 BC and 50 BC, I first discuss the observational material from the point of view of a Babylonian astronomer. This involves deriving synodic time intervals and synodic arcs from the observed dates and longitudes of Venus. Both vary with the position of Venus in the zodiac. This variation shows up most purely in the synodic arcs and synodic time intervals of Venus at its stations. The variation pattern of the synodic arcs and of the synodic time intervals at the first and last appearances of Venus differ considerably because they are strongly affected by atmospheric extinction and by the ecliptic latitude of Venus. A comparison of predictions of the first and last appearances of Venus computed according to system A3 with observations in the synthetic database shows that the models provide fairly accurate fits to the observations of evening last and morning first with typical standard deviations of about 2° but rather poor fits to the observations of morning last and evening first with typical standard deviations of about 7° and 4°. Quite surprisingly, it turns out that the morning first A3 model fits the observed longitudes of Venus at its stations almost perfectly, with standard deviations of about 1°. This suggests that observations of the stations of Venus must have been available to the Babylonian astronomer(s) who constructed the system A3 model of Venus and who computed the longitudes of Venus at its first and last appearances preserved in tablet BM 32599. This is quite puzzling because observations of the stations of Venus were definitely not part of the standard observing program of the Babylonian astronomers as we know it from the Astronomical Diaries. To resolve this problem, I propose that observations could have been made by some individual astronomer for his own use but that these observations never became part of the tradition of what was regularly observed and recorded in the Astronomical Diaries. It turns out that 25 years of observations of Venus (here illustrated for the years 203 BC to 178 BC) is sufficient for the construction of a system A model that perfectly fits the variation of the synodic arcs of Venus at its stations. By combining observed time intervals and known velocities of Venus, observations over this limited timespan can also be used to construct longitudes of Venus at its first and last appearances from previous known positions of Venus based on Normal Stars passages or from known positions at its stations. This is the only way in which positions of Venus at its first and last appearances can be determined because at its first and last appearances the sky is too bright for Normal Stars to be visible. I propose that the Babylonian system A3 models of Venus were based on longitudes constructed in this way. I finally suggest that the tablet, of which BM 32599 is the remainder, was filled line by line starting with a set of initial values in the bottom left-hand corner of the tablet and that the choice of these initial values was based on an observation of Venus at its evening station when it was exceptionally close to the Normal Star η Piscium in February 179 BC. Based on this choice of initial conditions, the tablet covers the years 403 BC to 170 BC and it may have been composed around 170 BC. It was probably computed with the purpose of creating a raster of longitudes with mazes of about 2.5° that could be used to predict future positions of Venus at its first or last appearance once a position at a previous first or last appearance was available. (shrink)

This paper analyses the relationship between Hobbes's theory of language and his theory of science and method. It is shown that Hobbes, at least in his Computatio sive Logica (1655), deviates in some measure from the traditional (Aristotelian) model of language. In this model speech is considered to be a fairly unproblematic expression of thought, which itself is independent of language. Basing himself on a nominalist account of universals, Hobbes states that the demonstration or assertion of universal propositions presupposes speech (...) (more especially, the use of names as marks). This insight turns out to be essential for Hobbes's (rationalist) view of scientific method. (shrink)

In this article, we will first give a historic overview of the concept of benefit sharing and its appearance in official agreements, particularly with respect to crop genetic resources. It will become clear that, at present, benefit sharing is primarily considered as an instrument of compensation or exchange, and thus refers to commutative justice. However, we believe that such a narrow interpretation of benefit sharing disregards, and even undermines, much of its (historical) content and potency, especially where crop genetic resources (...) are concerned. We argue that benefit sharing should not be based merely on commutative justice but rather on a broader model that is also grounded in the concept of distributive justice. This has repercussions for the application of benefit sharing, which we try to clarify by distinguishing between downstream and upstream benefit sharing. Upstream benefit sharing is not so much inspired by compensation for actions done, or the distribution downstream of benefits developed, but by the idea of shared decision‐making on the research and development of resources fundamental to human welfare. Going upstream in the research process of crop genetic resources, and determining research agendas and improving crops according to the needs of the poor, benefit sharing may well be a tool to contribute to world food security and global justice. We concretize our ideas on upstream benefit sharing by introducing a set of criteria that determine the success of consultations on agricultural research agenda setting. (shrink)

Throughout more than two millennia philosophers adhered massively to ideal standards of scientific rationality going back ultimately to Aristotle’s Analytica posteriora . These standards got progressively shaped by and adapted to new scientific needs and tendencies. Nevertheless, a core of conditions capturing the fundamentals of what a proper science should look like remained remarkably constant all along. Call this cluster of conditions the Classical Model of Science . In this paper we will do two things. First of all, we will (...) propose a general and systematized account of the Classical Model of Science. Secondly, we will offer an analysis of the philosophical significance of this model at different historical junctures by giving an overview of the connections it has had with a number of important topics. The latter include the analytic-synthetic distinction, the axiomatic method, the hierarchical order of sciences and the status of logic as a science. Our claim is that particularly fruitful insights are gained by seeing themes such as these against the background of the Classical Model of Science. In an appendix we deal with the historiographical background of this model by considering the systematizations of Aristotle’s theory of science offered by Heinrich Scholz, and in his footsteps by Evert W. Beth. (shrink)

Several studies have focused on the effects of corporate social responsibility fit on external stakeholders’ evaluations of CSR activities, attitudes towards companies or brands, and behaviors. The results so far have been contradictory. A possible reason may be that the concept of CSR fit is more complicated than previously assumed. Researchers suggest that there may be different types of CSR fit, but so far no empirical research has focused on a typology of CSR fit. This study fills this gap, describing (...) a qualitative content analysis of the congruence between six organizations and their various CSR activities. Ten annual reports and CSR reports were analyzed, and 102 specific CSR activities were identified. The results show that two levels of fit must be distinguished: based on the means for and the intended ends of the CSR activity. Furthermore, six different types of fit were found, focusing on products and services, production processes, environmental impact, employees, suppliers, and geographical location. Considering the above variety of fit possibilities, the findings emphasize the role of CSR communication as a means of creating fit perceptions. (shrink)

In this study I attempt to provide an answer to the question how the Babylonian scholars arrived at their mathematical theory of planetary motion. Although no texts are preserved in which the Babylonians tell us how they did it, from the surviving Astronomical Diaries we have a fairly complete picture of the nature of the observational material on which the scholars must have based their theory and from which they must have derived the values of the defining parameters. Limiting the (...) discussion to system A theory of the outer planets Saturn, Jupiter and Mars, I will argue that the development of Babylonian planetary theory was a gradual process of more than a century, starting sometime in the fifth century BC and finally resulting in the appearance of the first full-fledged astronomical ephemeris around 300 BC. The process of theory formation involved the derivation of long “exact” periods by linear combination of “Goal–Year” periods, the invention of a 360° zodiac, the discovery of the variable motion of the planets and the development of the numerical method to model this as a step function. Longitudes of the planets in the Babylonian zodiac could be determined by the scholars with an accuracy of 1° to 2° from observations of angular distances to Normal Stars with known positions. However, since the sky is too bright at first and last appearances of the planets and at acronychal rising for nearby stars to be visible, accurate longitudes as input for theoretical work could only be determined when the planets were near the stationary points in their orbits. In this study I show that the Babylonian scholars indeed based their system A modeling of the outer planets on planetary longitudes near stations, that their system A models of Saturn and Jupiter provided satisfactory results for all synodic phenomena, that they realized that their system A model of Mars did not produce satisfactory results for the second station so that separate numerical schemes were constructed to predict the positions of Mars at second station from the model at first station, and finally that their system A model for Mars provided quite poor predictions of the longitude of Mars at first and last appearances over large stretches of the zodiac. I further discuss ways in which the parameters of the system A models may have been derived from observations of the outer planets. By analyzing contemporaneous ephemerides from Uruk of four synodic phenomena of Jupiter from the second century BC, I finally illustrate how the Babylonian scholars may have used observations of Normal Star passages of planets to choose the initial conditions for their ephemerides. (shrink)

Prenatal screening for foetal abnormalities such as Down's syndrome differs from other forms of population screening in that the usual aim of achieving health gains through treatment or prevention does not seem to apply. This type of screening leads to no other options but the choice between continuing or terminating the pregnancy and can only be morally justified if its aim is to provide meaningful options for reproductive choice to pregnant women and their partners. However, this aim should not be (...) understood as maximizing reproductive choice per se. Only if understood as allowing prospective parents to avoid suffering related to living with (a child with) serious disorders and handicaps can prenatal screening be a publicly or collectively funded programme. The alternative of moving prenatal testing outside the healthcare system into the private sector is problematic, as it makes these tests accessible only to those who can afford to pay for it. New developments in prenatal screening will have to be assessed in terms of whether and to what extent they either contribute to or undermine the stated aim of providing meaningful options for reproductive choice. In the light of this criterion, this article discusses the introduction of the new non‐invasive prenatal test (NIPT), the tendency to widen the scope of follow‐up testing, as well as the possible future scenarios of genome‐wide screening and ‘prenatal personalised medicine’. The article ends with recommendations for further debate, research and analysis. (shrink)

Besides offering opportunities in both clinical and non-clinical domains, the application of novel neuroimaging technologies raises pressing dilemmas. ‘Responsible Research and Innovation’ (RRI) aims to stimulate research and innovation activities that take ethical and social considerations into account from the outset. We previously identified that Dutch neuroscientists interpret “responsible innovation” as educating the public on neuroimaging technologies via the popular press. Their aim is to mitigate (neuro)hype, an aim shared with the wider emerging RRI community. Here, we present results of (...) a media-analysis undertaken to establish whether the body of articles in the Dutch popular press presents balanced conversations on neuroimaging research to the public. We found that reporting was mostly positive and framed in terms of (healthcare) progress. There was rarely a balance between technology opportunities and limitations, and even fewer articles addressed societal or ethical aspects of neuroimaging research. Furthermore, neuroimaging metaphors seem to favour oversimplification. Current reporting is therefore more likely to enable hype than to mitigate it. How can neuroscientists, given their self-ascribed social responsibility, address this conundrum? We make a case for a collective and shared responsibility among neuroscientists, journalists and other stakeholders, including funders, committed to responsible reporting on neuroimaging research. (shrink)

Institutional theory of law (ITL) reflects both continuity and change of Kelsen's legal positivism. The main alteration results from the way ITL extends Hart's linguistic turn towards ordinary language philosophy (OLP). Hart holds -- like Kelsen -- that law cannot be reduced to brute fact nor morality, but because of its attempt to reconstruct social practices his theory is more inclusive. By introducing the notion of law as an extra-linguistic institution ITL takes a next step in legal positivism and accounts (...) for the relationship between action and validity within the legal system. There are, however, some problems yet unresolved by ITL. One of them is its theory of meaning. An other is the way it accounts for change and development. Answers may be based on the pragmatic philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, who emphasises the intrinsic relation between the meaning of speech acts and the process of habit formation. (shrink)

This paper concentrates on some aspects of the history of the analytic-synthetic distinction from Kant to Bolzano and Frege. This history evinces considerable continuity but also some important discontinuities. The analytic-synthetic distinction has to be seen in the first place in relation to a science, i.e. an ordered system of cognition. Looking especially to the place and role of logic it will be argued that Kant, Bolzano and Frege each developed the analytic-synthetic distinction within the same conception of scientific rationality, (...) that is, within the Classical Model of Science: scientific knowledge as cognitio ex principiis . But as we will see, the way the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments or propositions functions within this model turns out to differ considerably between them. (shrink)

Modal Meinongianism provides the semantics of sentences involving intentional verbs Priest. To that end, Modal Meinongianism employs a pointed non-normal quantified modal logic model. Like earlier Meinongian views Modal Meinongianism has a characterisation principle, that claims that any condition whatsoever is satisfied by some object in some world. Recently, Everett has proposed an argument against QCP that, if successful, gives rise to problems identical to those Russell raised for Naïve Meinongianism, namely that it allows for true contradictions, and allows us (...) to define anything into existence. Everett claims that the ordinary meanings of “actual” license an inference pattern, such that if an object satisfies Actual A at some world, then that object satisfies A in the actual world. Given that actual world is the designated point of evaluation for truth simpliciter, QCP would fall prey to Russell’s criticisms. As opposed to Everett, I argue that, even if we grant Everett the assumption that “actual” is a modal indexical that rigidly refers to the actual world, it does not conform to the inference pattern above. This is because when an object satisfies Actual A at some world, this alters the assertoric force of “actual”, because “actual” is interpreted in the scope of some modal or intentional operator. I also explain that Everett’s proposed example carries existential commitment because the problematic noun-phrase occurs outside the scope of a modal or intentional operator. (shrink)

Teacher discipline strategies are well documented when it comes to its effects on students and the working climate in the classroom. Although it is commonly acknowledged that for student teachers classroom management is a major concern, student teachers? use of discipline strategies is largely unknown. In this paper, we examine student teachers? beliefs in relation to their discipline strategies. Three clusters of discipline strategies are distinguished: sensitive, directive and aggressive discipline strategies. Beliefs that were taken into account are self-images on (...) control and affiliation, control orientation and anticipated student responses on control and affiliation. All participants were student teachers of a one-year teacher education programme for secondary education in the Netherlands. Student questionnaires were used to measure discipline strategies (n?=?2506). Student teachers? (n?=?104) self-images, control orientation and anticipated student responses were measured with student teacher questionnaires. Results of the multiple regression analyses showed that student teachers? sensitive and directive discipline strategies are explained best by self-images on control; aggressive discipline strategies are explained best by self-images on affiliation and by control orientation. Apart from the possible academic interest in these particular findings, results are believed to be useful in a practical sense, in particular for teacher education programmes. (shrink)

The Movement of Showing investigates the idea, shared by Derrida, Hegel and Heidegger, that the value of their thought is not found in its results or conclusions, but in its "movement." All three describe the heart of their work in terms of a pathway, development, or movement rather than in terms of its propositions or conclusions. This seems to deprive their thought of a solid ground, and indeed deconstruction in particular is often criticized in this way. Johan de Jong argues (...) that this is a structural vulnerability that is both its weakness and the source of its value, tracing Derrida's indirect method from his early to later works, and considering his engagements with Hegel and Heidegger. His analysis locates an affinity among Hegel, Heidegger and Derrida in a shared distrust of externality and, against the grain of some Levinasian commentaries, argues that Derrida's indirectness results in an ethics of complicity. The Movement of Showing answers a central question that many polemics about continental philosophy and postmodernism revolve around concerning how, methodologically, one can philosophize responsibly. It shows the difference between critique and polemics, and why simply taking up a position for or against is insufficient in order to think responsibly. (shrink)

According to the grammar of Port-Royal it is possible to convert the noun ‘homme’ into the adjective 'humain' by adding a confused signification or connotation. Strangely enough it is stipulated that by the reversal of this process the adjective 'human' is converted into the substantive ‘humanité’ rather than the original noun ‘homme’. In this article I argue that the treatment of adjectives and substantives in the Port-Royal grammar depends strongly on the traditional Aristotelian ontology as summarized in the so-called ontological (...) square and the theory of the predicables. In connection with this it is shown that according to the Port-Royalists corresponding concrete and abstract nouns like ‘homme’ and ‘humanité’, should be in some sense equivalent. (shrink)

This study argues that contemporary theology needs a reconceptualised form of metaphysical theology to readdress this question of universality. In order to develop such a new metaphysical theology, de Jong turns to the work of Karl Rahner and Edward Schillebeeckx. Presenting a new perspective on their theological methods, he demonstrates that these theologians employ a dialectical interplay of hermeneutical and metaphysical arguments yielding a modest theological metaphysics. Crucially, these thinkers recognise that acknowledging hermeneutical conditions does not need to end in (...) particularism. Instead, Rahner and Schillebeeckx argue that the infinite variety of particular human experiences can act as potential encounters with the universally self-revealing God. Retrieving these modest forms of theological metaphysics reminds contemporary theology that it is possible to think about universality from within particularity. Balancing the intelligible and mysterious nature of God, Rahner and Schillebeeckx show how a modest theological metaphysics contains its own self-critical hermeneutical disciplining. This renewed understanding about the earlier use of metaphysics opens up new avenues of thought for fundamental theologians that do not want to shy away from the difficult question of the universality of God. (shrink)

Where the possibility of metaphysics as a science is concerned, Kant assigns the exact sciences the function of an exemplar; for these disciplines have long been well established on "the secure path of a science." Accordingly, in the Prolegomena Kant explicitly addresses the question "How is metaphysics possible as a science?" by way of the questions "How is pure mathematics possible?" and "How is pure natural science possible?" Moreover, all these questions arise directly out of the main transcendental question: "How (...) are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" The deplorable situation of the metaphysics of the day would have been entirely attributable to misappraisal of this central transcendental question. (shrink)

“Fair and equitable benefit-sharing” is one of the objectives of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity and the FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. In essence, benefit-sharing holds that countries, farmers, and indigenous communities that grant access to their plant genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge should share in the benefits that users derive from these resources. But what exactly is understood by “fair” and “equitable” in this context? Neither term is defined in the international treaties. (...) A complicating factor, furthermore, is that different motivations and perspectives exist with respect to the notion of benefit-sharing itself. This paper looks at six different approaches to benefit-sharing that can be extracted from the current debates on “Access and Benefit-Sharing.” These approaches form the basis of a philosophical reflection in which the different connotations of “fair and equitable” are considered, by analyzing the main principles of justice involved. Finally, the various principles are brought together in order to draw some conclusions as to how a fair and equitable benefit-sharing mechanism might best be realized. This results in several recommendations for policymakers. (shrink)

In recent years, to protect the rights and welfare of human subjects, institutions in the USA have begun to set up programmes to monitor ongoing medical research. These programmes provide routine, onsite oversight, and thus go beyond existing oversight such as investigating suspected misconduct or reviewing paperwork provided by investigators. However, because of a lack of guidelines and evidence, institutions have had little guidance in setting up their programmes. To help institutions make the right choices, we used interviews and document (...) analysis to study how and why 11 US institutions have set up their monitoring programmes. Although these programmes varied considerably, we were able to distinguish two general types. ‘Compliance’ programmes on the one hand were part of the institutional review board office and set up to ensure compliance with regulations. Investigators’ participation was mandatory. Monitors focused on documentation. Investigators could be disciplined, and could be obliged to take corrective actions. ‘Quality-improvement’ programmes on the other hand were part of a separate office. Investigators requested to be monitored. Monitors focused more on actual research conduct. Investigators and other parties received feedback on how to improve the research process. Although both types of programmes have their drawbacks and advantages, we argue that if institutions want to set up monitoring programmes, quality improvement is the better choice: it can help foster an atmosphere of trust between investigators and the institutional review board, and can help raise the standards for the protection of human subjects. (shrink)

Quine's well-known ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ (1951) plays a key role in the debate about the analytic-synthetic distinction. Taking to task the ideas of Carnap in particular, Quine shows that logical positivism works with a concept of scientific rationality that is based dogmatically on, among other things, the opposition analytic-synthetic.